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ABSTRACT
The increasing adoption of smart automation has improved people’s lives 
in several ways, but it has also brought a host of new problems such as 
deskilling, deepening of structural inequalities, new forms of exploitation, 
loss of privacy and hindering of human liberties. This paper begins by 
assuming that such issues are the consequence of poor design and 
takes the opportunity to analyse what “good design” should mean in turn. 
Following insights from philosophy of technology, it surveys the general 
inherent complexities of automation and argues that Human-Centered 
Design (HCD) endorses an instrumentalist conception of technology. 
This paper shows that such a conception of human–technology relations 
significantly limits designers’ capacity to approach design from a genuinely 
ethical standpoint. The paper concludes with a sketch of principles that 
HCD should incorporate to become a truly humanist and ethically minded 
design approach. Ultimately, this paper argues that designers should 
seek not only to satisfy users’ needs but actively reflect on the role that 
technologies play in helping humans to attain a “good life”. In other words, 
they should start by asking themselves what our human project for the 
future is.



























































Over the past decades, thanks to a combination of new Artificial 
Intelligence (AI)  methods and the exponential growth of computing power, 
Internet networks, and data availability, automation has become “smart”. 
In most developed regions of the world, smart automation has turned 
vital for human well-being. A growing number of consumer and industrial 
products and services across every area of human activity now depend 
on some form of smart, automated system. At the same time, the growth 
of automation is bringing new forms of exploitation, discrimination, and 
abuse; deepening existing structural inequalities and severely threaten 
privacy and democratic liberties. Seen from a purely instrumentalist 
standpoint, many of these systems are well built and remarkably 
efficient. However, from a moral standpoint, they are nothing short of 
nefarious. Such poorly designed systems (in the sense that they worsen, 
rather than improve people’s lives) can be attributed to incompetence, 
lack of resources, ignorance, misguided principles, or outright malice. 
Nevertheless, whatever the explanation, it is clear that the designers who 
developed these systems failed to consider the ethical consequences of 
their creations or, at best, treated them as an afterthought. This lack of 
explicit ethical guidelines, however, is not exclusive of misshapen design 
approaches, but a problem that also afflicts Human-Centered Design 
(HCD), the dominant paradigm in digital product design nowadays.
Avoiding poor design is always necessary, but in the case of smart 
automation the situation is urgent, for nowadays we are setting the pace 
and tone of the technological developments that will shape society for 
decades to come. That is why one of the central questions that people 
involved in the design of smart automation must address from the outset 
is how to create systems that genuinely improve people’s lives while 
minimising potential negative impacts. In other words, they ought to think 
about what “good design” should mean in the age of smart automation.
This paper takes the above question as a starting point. Following 
insights from philosophy of design and philosophy of technology, this 
paper argues HCD should revise its implicit commitments to technological 
instrumentalism. This paper argues that to become genuinely humanistic, 
HCD should focus not merely on satisfying users’ needs. It contends that 
designers should strive to make explicit their assumptions and biases 
about technological systems and the long-term impact they can have on 
people and society by focusing not on the technical and methodological 
obstacles impeding their fruition but on the minimum ethical requirements 
they should meet. Ultimately, this paper argues that design has a crucial 
responsibility in developing our human project for the future. It is important 
to note, however, that the principles here outlined are nothing but rough 
sketches and therefore still require considerable reworking before 
reaching a potential normative level. The exercise here developed should 
be seen as a starting point for developing a more thorough critique of 
contemporary design approaches and how they respond to the social 

























































102 2. THE PROBLEMS WITH SMART AUTOMATION
Humans have been automating tasks for a long time; this propensity to 
“off-load” work to artificial systems1 is arguably a crucial aspect of being 
human (Martinho-Truswell, 2018). Traditionally, automation involved 
delegating the execution of physical or non-cognitive tasks initially carried 
out by humans or animals (e.g., beasts of burden) to mechanical devices 
(Danaher, 2018; Johnson & Verdicchio, 2017). In the last decades, 
however, the development of computational tools in general, and AI 
in particular, has enabled automated systems to take over cognitive 
tasks. Since their aim is to replace “human manual control, planning and 
problem solving” (Bainbridge, 1983, p. 775) to carry out specific tasks, 
smart automated systems may be regarded as instances of “cognitive 
outsourcing” (Danaher, 2018).
Automation implies that a system is capable of accomplishing a 
given process without human intervention during runtime. Nonetheless, 
all types of automation still require human supervision; if not to start 
them, at least to guarantee their proper functioning, to adjust them, 
to provide maintenance, and to improve and expand their features 
(Bainbridge, 1983). For simple automated systems, the former tasks are 
less problematic; but as their complexity grows, so does the oversight 
they require. Since it is a human that ensures an automated system 
is operating safely and is also responsible for mitigating its potential 
malfunctions, it follows that the more complex the automation, the more 
crucial the role of the human becomes (Strauch, 2018). In this sense, and 
regardless of how sophisticated they might be, automated systems can 
still be regarded as human–machine systems (Bainbridge, 1983).
The main reasons for adopting automated systems are that they 
are faster, more reliable, and efficient than human beings carrying out the 
same tasks; this tends to be true for the most part. Ironically, however, 
errors or operational constraints introduced when automated systems are 
designed can become a source of problems that, invariably, need to be 
addressed by humans (Bainbridge, 1983; Strauch, 2018). Designing an 
automated system implies abstracting processes; breaking them down 
into definite tasks and then organising them into sequences. Hence, 
automation implies a deep understanding of the processes it takes 
over. Tasks that follow explicit procedural logic (e.g., simple arithmetic 
operations) are easier to formalise and automate. That is why machines 
vastly surpass human speed and accuracy when it comes to computing 
(Autor, 2014).
However, that is not the case for processes that require flexibility, 
judgement, common sense, and improvisation. Tasks such as cooking an 
omelette or inventing a (good) joke are easy for humans to accomplish, 
but difficult to automate; not because humans know the “rules” governing 
them, but because we quickly develop tacit understanding of how they 
work (Autor, 2014). Ironically, then, although systems are explicitly 
designed to replace human work, other humans end up carrying out the 
tasks that could not be automated (Bainbridge, 1983). That is why we still 
1  A system may be understood as 
an entity that can be separated into 
parts, which are all simultaneously 
linked to each other in specific ways 

























































103 have to make all sorts of input graspable for machines. To paraphrase the 
late anthropologist David Graeber (2018), the problem of automating tasks 
that are simple for humans but complicated for machines to accomplish is 
that users have to carry out essentially all the semantic labour. To put it in 
Flusserian terms, in this relation the human “functions as the functionary 
of a function” (Flusser, 2014).
Historically, automation has been more prevalent in sociotechnical 
systems2 such as agriculture, industry, and transportation. Ubiquitous 
computing and new AI methods, however, have allowed smart automation 
to become integral for (and in the process radically change) a growing 
number of everyday human activities. Smart AI-powered automated 
systems require vast amounts of data, both to be developed (trained) 
and to carry out their tasks. Whereas “traditional” automation relied on 
a fixed set of instructions based on the designer’s understanding of the 
process that would be automated, smart automation is more ambitious. 
For example, smart automation based on Machine Learning (ML) relies 
on patterns derived from vast amounts of data about human conduct. 
Usually, the services provided by smart automation require predicting 
human behaviour, so the more data they have about a user’s context and 
activities, the better they perform3. Hence why smart, automated systems 
are often deliberately conceived to acquire as much data as possible from 
their users, usually without their explicit knowledge and consent.
User data has become so valuable that certain forms of automation 
are built for no other reason than to create a data surplus. This continuous 
extraction and accumulation of information is the backbone of a new 
exploitative economic system threatening fundamental human liberties 
called “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015). Entire organisations are 
now invested in developing such “dishonest” forms of automation that 
not only extract data but, to do so, also force onto users behaviours for 
which they have no legitimate need or desire (Girardin, 2019). These and 
other (supposedly benign) forms of smart automation, such as algorithms 
supporting decision-making, can easily lead to new forms of exploitation, 
discrimination, and abuse; they can deepen existing structural inequalities 
and severely threaten privacy and democratic liberties.
Such poorly designed systems (in the sense that they worsen, rather 
than improve people’s lives) can be attributed to incompetence, lack of 
resources, ignorance, misguided principles, or even malice. However, in 
the case of contemporary smart automation, the main culprit—besides 
the ruthless logic of growth imposed by venture capital—is arguably 
a mixture of overconfidence, cultural biases, and misunderstandings 
concerning human–technology relations. Technically minded people 
responsible for inadequate smart, automated systems tend to focus solely 
on the immediate positive aspects of technologies and scantly on their 
potential downsides; usually caring more for the economic success of their 
creations than for the well-being of their users (Norman, 2010). Rarely 
do they stop to ponder whether their creations should materialise in the 
first place. In other words, they fail to consider the ethical consequences 
of their designs. Generally, these designers fail to consider that any new 
2  A sociotechnical system may be 
regarded as a hybrid system (i.e., one 
whose components belong to many 
different worlds) with an extremely 
high degree of complexity that has 
many users at any given moment, and 
that involves people both as users 
and operators (Vermaas et al., 2011).
3  The problem, however, is that 
ML models are often inscrutable, 
meaning that those who 
conceived and trained them do 
not have a clear understanding 

























































104 product or service will be embedded within larger and massively complex 
sociotechnical systems, leading to unforeseen consequences and risks 
for society as a whole. Such an approach to design that is not guided 
by (ethically grounded) human interests is not only poor but wrong. 
The question then is, what would be an acceptable way to develop less 
problematic smart automated systems. That is, what does good design 
should mean in the age of smart automation?
3. THE IDEA OF “GOOD DESIGN”
Asking what a good design approach is necessarily implies asking 
what good design is. Both are questions of an ethical nature. Ethics is 
understood here as the broader problem space of how people should 
lead their lives best and, therefore, what should we strive to be, and which 
activities are genuinely valuable to pursue, and which are not. Since most, 
if not all, of these activities often require interacting with some artificial (i.e., 
designed) thing, it is clear that design has a strong relation to ethical issues.
The idea of “good design” and that design has a powerful impact 
over human life is a tenet of this discipline since its origins in the late 
nineteenth century. The emergence of the Arts and Crafts Movement—
arguably the cradle of modern theorisation about design—was driven by 
concerns about how the (good) quality of designed objects could affect 
not only individuals but societies at large. Modernism sought to strengthen 
this link, shaping the idea of design as a vehicle for human progress. 
By blurring the divide between ethics and aesthetics, the modernist 
understanding of good design assumed that artefacts that resulted from 
the proper synthesis of strictly necessary formal beauty and functionality 
would naturally improve people’s values and behaviour (Buchanan, 2005). 
Modernist views on design cannot be detached from its broader views 
about art, politics, society, and human nature, to the contrary, they are 
intimately related (Parsons, 2015). The modernist conception of design, 
despite its excessive focus on functionality, continues to be a necessary 
reference, not only for understanding the evolution of the discipline, but 
also the intrinsically ethical nature of design. Good design in the modernist 
tradition must always pursue genuinely human(ist) interests; good design 
ultimately should have the end purpose of helping people accomplish their 
own purposes (Buchanan, 2005). Good design is, therefore, instrumental 
for satisfying human needs.
Although modernist normative ideals about design have been 
undermined by postmodernist critique, some modernist principles continue 
to be alive and well within contemporary design approaches4. The 
(arguably functionalist) argument that products exist ultimately to help 
human beings pursue their goals and, therefore, usability5 ought to be 
privileged above cost, durability or aesthetics (Norman, 1990) is central 
for Human-Centred Design (HCD)—also known as User-Centered Design 
(UCD)6. As the name implies, HCD is an approach to designing that 
always starts by understanding the needs of the people using a product, 
4  Related to the title of this 
paper, see Dieter Ram’s highly 
influential principles for good 
design (Garreta Domingo, 2020).
5  Usability is understood here in 
terms of the standard definition, 
as the “extent to which a system, 
product or service can be used by 
specified users to achieve defined 
goals with effectiveness, efficiency, 
and satisfaction in a specified context 
of use” (ISO EN 9241-11, 2018).
6  Looking closely, there are 
differences between HCD and 
UCD. While both are concerned 
with human needs, UCD may be 
regarded as a more compact subset 
of HCD as it categorises people 
as  “users” from the start. For the 
sake of simplicity, in this paper, the 

























































105 ideally not only at the individual level, but also at the collective level. HCD 
is the dominant paradigm in most contemporary design methodologies, 
particularly for Interaction Design (IxD) and User Experience (UX).
HCD’s origins can be traced back to the early 1980s, to the 
multidisciplinary “Project on Human-Machine Interaction” from the 
Institute for Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego, 
headed by Don Norman. The findings of the project were condensed in 
the influential book, User Centered System Design7 (Norman & Draper, 
1986). Several of the ideas developed by Norman’s group echoed the 
guidelines proposed by Gould & Lewis (1985) in the article “Designing for 
usability”, which argued in favour of adopting an empirical approach in 
systems design based on thorough user research and intensive cycles of 
prototyping and testing. 
Nowadays, the main elements that characterise HCD methodologies 
include: analysing user practices empirically; employing interdisciplinary 
research; combining qualitative and quantitative data gathering and 
analysis; carrying out iterative prototyping and testing at various levels 
of fidelity; regarding the user as an expert possessing crucial (tacit) 
practical knowledge; and involving different stakeholders throughout the 
design process (Göransdotter & Redström, 2018). HCD methodologies 
are far from homogeneous and are also continuously evolving. However, 
as noted above, they have in common a commitment to the idea that 
technologies—particularly those involving computational tools and, 
therefore, smart automation—ultimately should be designed to improve 
people’s lives. What such improvement means depends on the particular 
technology, the context where it is implemented, and the tasks it replaces.
Although HCD methodologies are now applied in most design fields, 
they have been traditionally employed in the design of computational or 
software-based devices—or at least, of their user interfaces (UI). The 
reason is that HCD emerged more or less around the time software-
based tools started becoming consumer products. These devices were, 
and continue to be, necessarily complex8, as we will see in the following 
section. Proponents of HCD saw design playing a crucial role in bridging 
the divide between these devices and their users. According to HCD, the 
task of the designer is to make the complexity of computational systems 
understandable for the user; meaning the designer would have to assume 
a mediating and epistemic duty.
4. COMPLEXITY AND USER-CENTERED DESIGN
Every technological system has “an inherent amount of irreducible 
complexity” (Norman, 2010, p. 46). Complexity is present in—and 
arguably necessary for—many aspects of human life; this makes it 
unavoidable. Complexity is not problematic per se; it only becomes an 
issue when we do not understand it and, consequently, feel confused. 
Poorly understood complexity is, in this sense, complicated. Good design, 
7  The name “User Centered 
System Design” was originally an 
alliteration of the abbreviated name 
of the University of California, San 
Diego (UCSD). (Norman & Draper, 
1986 iX) credit Paul Smolensky with 
having come up with the idea.
8  Complexity is understood here 
as the quality of something (e.g., 
a system) consisting of many 
interconnected parts and whose 
behaviour requires considerable 


























































106 according to HCD, is not about making things less complex (i.e., simple), 
but less complicated, meaning, understandable (Norman, 2010).
Software-based devices are comparatively more difficult to use 
than their analogue counterparts. A word processor is significantly more 
complicated than any typewriter ever was. Software-based devices are 
also more challenging to use because they have a broader range of 
context-dependent states. A hammer, for example, does not have modifier 
keys to alter its behaviour; whereas gestures in a touchscreen and 
commands in a keyboard can trigger many different actions.
HCD argues that designers should seek a proper balance between 
the complexity of the underlying structure, behaviour, and limitations 
of a system, and the ways users intuitively conceive it. That means 
achieving a balance between the “implementation model” (i.e., the actual 
system’s logic) and the “user’s model” through a less complicated, usable 
“represented model” of the system (Cooper et al., 1995/2014) materialised 
in an adequately designed UI. Nonetheless, when a designer achieves a 
less complicated interaction for the user, the underlying complexity of the 
system increases accordingly. This paradox is known as “Tesler’s law of 
the conservation of complexity” (Norman, 2010; see also Saffer, 2010, p. 
136). It follows that when the UI is usable, the backend is likely complex; 
conversely, when the backend is optimised for the system’s benefit, users 
will likely have to deal with a confusing implementation model.
Inherent in this oversimplified summary of HCD is the idea that 
designing involves mediating the relationship between humans and 
technologies; technologies whose goal is ultimately to serve human 
purposes; technologies which, paradoxically, are implicitly characterised 
as neutral instruments. Good design for HCD came to mean design 
that is above all useful (i.e., functional in achieving a given task), usable 
(i.e., understandable), and desirable. HCD’s belief that a product that is 
designed to meet the genuine needs (i.e., needs that are supported by 
empirical evidence) of users is necessarily good betrays a modernist 
conception of human–technology relations. 
Most design approaches based on HCD such as User Experience 
do consider the phenomenological dimension of technological interaction 
by focusing not just on usability but on the quality and enjoyment that 
products bring for users (Hassenzahl, 2010; Norman, 1990/2013). 
Nonetheless, their analysis of the mediating role of technologies and the 
implications it has across all aspects of human life remains limited.
5. HOW MEDIATION THEORY CAN HELP
Designing digital objects involves different processes than designing 
analogue or mechanical equivalents. Digitalisation has changed the 
traditional role of designers as “sculptural shape-makers” (Sudjic, 2015). 
Designers now have to explore ways in which objects can actively 
communicate their purpose and meaning. As noted earlier, HCD is 

























































107 approach in Interaction Design (IxD). As a multidisciplinary field where 
psychology, engineering, design, and aesthetics meet, IxD focuses on the 
ways people interact with software-based devices (Norman, 1990/2013). 
Ideally, interaction designers should not regard the product (just) as a 
concrete “thing” but as a “locus” of action and activity (Buchanan, 2001). 
IxD is therefore mainly concerned with shaping not just form and function, 
but mainly artificial behaviour. This behaviour manifests primarily as 
sequences of images on flat screens—increasingly supported by voice, 
sounds and haptics—through which the user navigates in a seemingly 
logical fashion. In summary, the core idea upon which IxD is grounded 
as a field is that what is designed is not things but interactions between 
humans and technologies.
The problem is that, as a concept, “interaction” —i.e., action in-
between—is not enough for understanding technological artefacts and the 
complex relations human establish with and through them. Furthermore, 
as Verbeek (2015) argues, the very concept of interaction presupposes 
the separation of human subjects on one side and technological objects 
on the other. For contemporary philosophy of technology and mediation 
theory, in particular, such dichotomy is problematic because it overlooks 
that, through technologies, humans fabricate their circumstances, and 
therefore, themselves (see Hernández-Ramı́rez, 2019, pp. 20–21). The 
subject vs object dichotomy negates the artificiality of being human, 
the intrinsically human origin of technologies, and hence that, from an 
ontological standpoint, humans and their devices are mutually constitutive.
Verbeek argues that the specific relation between a human and 
a given technology is but a part of a broader relation between humans 
and their world “in which technologies play a mediating role”. It follows 
that designers create not just interactions but rather human–world 
relations “in which practices and experiences take shape” (2015, p. 28). 
As previously noted, some HCD approaches do recognise the broader 
phenomenological implications of design and hence focus not just on 
interactions but on the “user experience” elicited by a product. However, 
for UX practitioners, human–technology relations continue to be defined 
in terms of functionality and use: a pleasurable and therefore good 
experience is ultimately dependent on the artefact being thoroughly 
functional (i.e., because it satisfies a specific human need). The problem 
with this view, as Verbeek notes, is that many relations we have with 
contemporary technologies cannot be adequately characterised solely 
in terms of use and goals—e.g., when dealing with recommendation 
algorithms it is not entirely clear who the user actually is. Moreover, 
goals do not exist independently from the technologies that enable them, 
a prime example is social media, which has brought “new types and 
dimensions of social relations” not intended initially when these systems 
were designed (2015, p. 28). Whenever a given technology becomes 
part of a sociotechnical system, unexpected consequences are bound to 
emerge.
According to mediation theory, Human–technology relations are 

























































108 modernism might concede. Technologies are not just extensions of human 
capacities; they can also enhance, augment or completely replace them. 
Technologies are not opposed to human nature but rather are intrinsically 
bound to it. Characterising technologies foremost as mediators allows us 
to inspect how they shape our understanding of the world and ourselves. 
Seen like this, designing interactions implies designing a system that will 
mediate the relation between humans and their environment and thus, 
implies designing how they live their lives (Verbeek, 2015).
Designers are by no means morally neutral agents (Buchanan, 
2005). They inscribe values, preferences, and prejudices about the world 
in their designs. Their choices are embedded in the solutions they find 
to address the problems they encounter. Since each product is intended 
to be used by another human being and that usage is directed towards 
a given goal, it is not difficult to concede that every product embodies 
an argument about how we should carry out that activity, and, therefore, 
about how we should lead our lives (Buchanan, 2001). Hence, designing 
interactions implies designing not only the technological objects but also 
the human subject (i.e., the user) who will interact with it. Bluntly put, 
designing technologies is, in a way, designing human beings (2015, p. 
28). Granting the previous arguments, we can agree that “designing is a 
form of ethics” (Buchanan, 2005, p. 508) or at least a way of “doing ethics 
by other means” (Verbeek, 2006). A good approach to designing hence 
should involve taking a position about the role that artefacts play in human 
lives and anticipating the consequences they might bring for human 
welfare.
6. TOWARDS AN ETHICALLY MINDED HCD
HCD is the dominant paradigm in Interaction Design and User Experience 
design. From a purely methodological standpoint, HCD should be one of 
the best means to minimise poorly implemented automation. However, 
our world continues to be further populated by systems that incite users 
with “perverse incentives” (Loh & Misselhorn, 2018), dark patterns 
(Monteiro, 2019), and algorithms that deepen structural inequalities. Smart 
automated systems are already complex networks of algorithms, sensors, 
human agents interacting under changing contexts and at different time 
scales (Woods, 2016). The ironies of automation discussed in section 
two are further increased by the risks and complexities of contemporary 
computational infrastructure, namely, the fact that even the simplest 
interconnected system is embedded within a growing ecosystem of 
“balkanised operating systems, stacks of numerous protocols, versions, 
frameworks, and other packages of reusable code” (Girardin, 2019). 
Designers who follow HCD should not just focus on making the complexity 
of these systems understandable. Given how many aspects of people’s 
well-being now depend on them, HCD design should also be about 
protecting people from the accidental and deliberate misuses of these 

























































109 of usable technologies but also, or rather, mostly, “gatekeepers” (Monteiro, 
2019) for their users. HCD needs more than empathy towards users; it 
needs to assume a clear stance about the role of design on technological 
development and, therefore over human life, since products have short 
and long-term consequences for individuals, society, and the natural 
environment at large (Buchanan, 2005). When looking at products as 
mediators of human experience, it becomes challenging to distinguish 
design from ethics and politics.
HCD needs to rethink how it characterises good design. The idea 
that thoroughly understanding users’ needs with just enough science and 
coming up with products that are usable and fully satisfy those needs is 
sufficient for design to be good has to be challenged. Reducing applied 
ethics in design to the correct application of a methodology is a rather 
poor approach, even from a normative moral standard. Furthermore, 
an approach that focuses solely on satisfying needs, regardless of how 
genuine the empirical evidence shows them to be, assumes that those 
needs exist independently of the technology that will satisfy them. Such 
instrumentalist view perpetuates the notions that technologies are neutral, 
and that subjects and objects can be independently of each other.
An argument can be made that unethical design can be curtailed 
through regulation. Designers, being experienced professionals, could 
simply abide to the moral standards of fairness, honesty, and loyalty 
expected in any business relationship (Buchanan, 2005, p. 505). As 
moral agents, designers are expected to follow the standards necessary 
for maintaining product integrity, such as complying with laws and 
regulations governing the safety and reliability of products. After all, these 
regulations exist for a reason. The problem with this argument, however, 
is that regulation tends to lag rather than accompany technological 
developments.
As shown by the recent scandal involving Joichi Ito and the MIT 
Media Lab, academic AI ethics has been skilfully manipulated into 
becoming mere whitewashing for otherwise unethical forms of automation 
(Hao, 2019; Ochigame, 2019) mostly because this approach has grown 
around the idea of voluntary compliance. Furthermore, designing an 
embedded Asimov-style moral code into smart automated systems is 
a considerably difficult task since it involves reducing the complexities 
of ethical principles to procedural steps (Ceglowski, 2016). Academic 
committees counselling on potential ethical mishaps with no actual 
influence over design processes is a recipe for inaction. Then, it should be 
up to designers to take the lead.
The design process itself should be imbued with an ethical 
framework. The responsibility should be put in the designer, as well as in 
the product of her work. Ethics cannot be regarded as moral aspirin but as 
an integral aspect of doing design. This ethical framework might involve 
adopting a starker and more careful attitude towards automation, it should 
include following a kind of via negativa9 approach that focuses not on what 
could be beneficial, but on everything that could go wrong should a given 
form of automation is allowed to come into fruition. Nevertheless, for this 
9  That is, “the principle that we know 
what is wrong with more clarity than 
what is right, and that knowledge 
grows by subtraction” (Taleb, 2018, 
Book I); see also Taleb (2012, Book 

























































110 to happen, designers need to see beyond instrumentalism and incorporate 
a critical framework for thinking about human–technology relations and 
how artefacts influence our multileveled engagement with the world.
An ethically minded HCD approach should start by asking what 
the purpose of a given technological system is, e.g., asking whether its 
implementation will improve or negatively affect human life. The former 
implies considering whether a given process should be automated at all. 
Automation, as we have seen, is an attempt to reduce the complexities 
of a given circumstance into piece-meal deterministic steps. However, 
because many aspects of any given process cannot be automated there is 
always room for unknown complications to emerge. These complications 
are further increased because, the training of smart automation is always 
done with available information, this narrowing exponentially increments 
the space of unknowns when dealing with complex situations, as the 
problem of induction illustrates. Consequently, what I propose here is 
that rather than focusing on the how’s of smart automation, an ethically-
minded HCD should always begin with the why’s. That is, the designer 
should ask what kind of trade-offs should be assumed if her design is 
indeed implemented.
As was earlier noted, a goal of HCD is making technologies 
understandable. For an ethically minded HCD, this should imply making 
systems that are more transparent and honest about their limitations, 
potential side effects, and dependencies. This implies the system 
should be obtrusive under certain circumstances and more honest 
about the frictions it might bring to its users. An ethically minded HCD 
should always analyse user tasks and goals within a broader context. 
Technologies are never neutral or inert, their introduction always affects 
a given context; their being and meaning are always situated, and the 
very fact of using a given instrument continually modifies the task itself. 
An ethically minded HCD should be keenly aware of the mediation role 
of automated systems and technologies at large. This implies a broader 
understanding of experience that strives to eliminate the barrier between 
aesthetics and ethics. Understanding automated systems as situated 
also means adopting a sociotechnical systems approach to design. An 
ethically minded HCD requires awareness of designer’s blind spots about 
technology, that is, about the hidden assumptions they have about what a 
given system can and should do for users.
What is needed then is not just integrating some generic concepts 
about ethics into HCD approaches but making applied design ethics a 
core aspect of HCD. Mediation theory and other approaches to philosophy 
of technology, as well as philosophy of design can be instrumental in this 
regard, helping designers to develop skills to question basic assumptions 
about their design processes. In other words, designers should be 
equipped with the tools to approach the philosophical dimension of design 
issues and their assumptions about their beliefs and practices, treating 
them as problem spaces open to reasonable discussion. HCD needs 
to reconsider its standard for good design and therefore steer way from 

























































111 them to come, professional designers and academics must take action. 
An excellent place to start is design education. Young designers should 
be trained not only in design research but also have a critical, situated, 
understanding of technology and the tools to problematise it from a design 
standpoint. Design education should thus be supported by professional 
applied ethicists with sufficient knowledge of design processes and 
practices, and curricula should be updated to include a philosophical tool 
to support design research.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper began with the assumption that lousy automation is “bad 
design”. It argued that good design should not just make complexity 
understandable. As we have seen then, it is virtually impossible to build 
error-free traditional automated systems because humans are integral 
to their operation. Good design is not just empathy; good design is 
research, iteration, questioning, tire-kicking and diversity. This paper has 
shown there is a lack of correspondence between the ideals of HCD and 
what in fact, comes out of design processes. Based on this critique, this 
paper argued that HCD should provide a richer, fairer, ethically cantered, 
framework for designers. However, to do so, HCD needs to make explicit its 
stance on technologies, recognising their mediating role and thus to critically 
look at the moral, political and social consequences of digital devices.
HCD should recognise that design is political. This realisation 
should be the starting point to determine what is good design and how 
that measure will affect design in the years to come. This paper, however, 
clearly has not solved HCD once and for all, nor has it proven beyond 
doubt what good design should mean nowadays. There is still much 
work to do in this regard. However, it has managed to start calling into 
question the neutrality that HCD practitioners often assume this approach 
has. This paper regards design as a collective enterprise that requires 
designers to work not on behalf of people but with people; that asks of 
designers to behave as gatekeepers with skin in the game that strive 
to achieve not minimum viable prototypes, but minimum ethical ones. 
Ultimately, designers should ask what purposes technologies have in 
human life. They should ask themselves what our human project for the 
future is. Future work on this regard should include a thorough analysis of 
the hidden assumptions that design methodologies have about human–
technology relations, but also developing new frameworks. The arguments 
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